Stablecoins are private financial products, but their consequences are becoming increasingly public. As their use expands across payments, savings and international transfers, the debate can no longer focus exclusively on fraud, reserve requirements or compliance. A more fundamental issue is emerging: how much influence over money should private institutions exercise without a corresponding increase in public accountability?
This matters because money is not an ordinary commercial product. It determines how people save, pay, price goods and move wealth across borders. Once a private financial instrument begins performing these functions on a sufficiently large scale, its impact can extend to national monetary systems.
Private companies, public monetary influence
Tether illustrates this transformation particularly well. Its USD₮ is the largest dollar stablecoin, while Giancarlo Devasini, Tether’s chairman and one of the central figures behind the company, maintains an unusually reserved public profile.
In September 2026, GQ Italia reported that a formal request to interview Devasini through Tether’s press office received no response. [1]
There is nothing unusual about an entrepreneur wanting privacy. But personal privacy should be distinguished from institutional accountability.
Tether is not selling an ordinary consumer product. It provides an instrument capable of moving monetary value internationally and potentially influencing savings decisions, capital flows and demand for sovereign assets. When private actors reach this degree of financial relevance, greater transparency, supervision and engagement with legitimate journalistic scrutiny become reasonable expectations.
Banks are also private companies, but because their activities affect the monetary and financial system, society subjects them to supervision and disclosure requirements. Stablecoin issuers are different institutions, but the underlying principle remains relevant: greater monetary influence should be accompanied by greater accountability.
Two governments, two strategies
The growing importance of stablecoins becomes particularly visible when comparing the United States and China.
The United States has chosen to integrate them into its financial strategy. President Donald Trump signed the GENIUS Act in July 2025, establishing a federal framework for payment stablecoins. The White House explicitly connected their expansion with strengthening the international position of the dollar and generating demand for US Treasuries. The Treasury made the same connection. (White House: https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-signs-genius-act-into-law/; US Treasury: https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0197). [2-3]
Tether subsequently supported the launch of USA₮, a federally regulated dollar-backed stablecoin issued by Anchorage Digital Bank and led by Bo Hines, formerly Executive Director of the White House Crypto Council.This does not make Tether an instrument of the US government. It does, however, show how the interests of private stablecoin issuers and national monetary strategies can intersect. [4-5]
China has moved in the opposite direction. Chinese authorities have maintained strict restrictions on virtual currencies, including stablecoins, limiting their ability to develop as an alternative monetary infrastructure within mainland China.
Different strategies therefore reflect the same recognition: stablecoins have become relevant to monetary sovereignty. [6-7]
An easier route towards dollarisation
This geopolitical dimension becomes clearer in economies with weaker currencies.
Traditionally, dollarisation required access to physical dollars, foreign bank accounts or relatively sophisticated financial services. Stablecoins can dramatically lower these barriers. A smartphone and digital wallet can provide exposure to a dollar-denominated instrument.
For someone facing high inflation, this can be rational and beneficial. But when the same decision is replicated across millions of households and businesses, the macroeconomic consequences change.
Savings and transactions can gradually migrate away from the national currency. Monetary policy may consequently become less effective, while the economy becomes increasingly exposed to decisions taken by the Federal Reserve rather than its own central bank.
Stablecoins can therefore transform traditional dollarisation into digital dollarisation, potentially reinforcing the international monetary influence of the United States without requiring physical dollars to circulate abroad. (ECB (2026), From Money Market Funds to Stablecoins: Lessons for Central Banks.). [7]
Efficiency has another side
The same technological characteristics that make stablecoins attractive for legitimate users can also make them useful for illicit finance.
Their relative price stability, international transferability and ability to move through unhosted wallets can facilitate transactions outside conventional financial intermediaries.
The Financial Action Task Force warned in 2026 that stablecoins are increasingly being misused for money laundering, sanctions evasion and other illicit activities. Citing Chainalysis, FATF reported that stablecoins represented 84% of the $154 billion in illicit virtual-asset transaction volume identified for 2025. (FATF: https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Virtualassets/targeted-report-stablecoins-unhosted-wallets.html). [8-9]
Tax authorities face a related challenge. The OECD has specifically identified tax evasion and avoidance risks arising from the international expansion of crypto-assets and developed the Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework to extend automatic exchange of tax information to this new environment. (OECD: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/07/bringing-tax-transparency-to-crypto-assets-an-update_fa222834/b33c9aa1-en.pdf). [10]
None of this means that stablecoins are intrinsically connected to criminality. Their speed and accessibility provide genuine benefits. The point is almost the opposite: the more effective they become as monetary instruments, the more important appropriate oversight becomes.
Private innovation needs public accountability
Stablecoins can improve cross-border payments, reduce frictions and provide protection for people living with unstable currencies. Their development should therefore not be reduced to a narrative about risk.
But neither should they be treated simply as another technological product.
When privately issued instruments begin affecting tax enforcement, illicit financial flows, demand for government debt, international currency competition and the effectiveness of national monetary policy, their public significance changes.
The question is therefore no longer simply whether stablecoins should be allowed to innovate. It is whether private monetary power can continue to grow without an equivalent development of transparency, supervision and public accountability.
Money has always been more than a product. The stablecoin era does not change that principle. It makes it more important.
References
[1] GQ Italia. Luca Zorloni, A Lugano sulle tracce di Giancarlo Devasini, 1 September 2026. https://www.gqitalia.it/article/giancarlo-devasini-uomo-piu-ricco-italia-tether
[2] White House. Fact Sheet on the GENIUS Act, 18 July 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-signs-genius-act-into-law/
[3] U.S. Treasury. Statement by Secretary Scott Bessent on enactment of the GENIUS Act, 18 July 2025. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0197
[4] Anchorage Digital. Anchorage Digital and Tether Introduce USA₮, 2026. https://www.anchorage.com/press-room/anchorage-digital-tether-introduce-usat
[5] Tether. Tether Unveils USA₮ and Announces Bo Hines, 12 September 2025. https://tether.io/news/tether-unveils-usat-its-planned-u-s-regulated-dollar-backed-stablecoin-and-will-appoint-bo-hines-as-ceo-of-tether-usat/
[6] People’s Bank of China. A Joint Meeting Convened to Curb Speculations in Virtual Currency Trading, 28 November 2025. https://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688110/3688172/5552468/2025121116132332435/index.html
[7] European Central Bank. Isabel Schnabel, From money market funds to stablecoins, 1 June 2026. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2026/html/ecb.sp260601~38dffe5ec5.en.html
[8] FATF. Targeted Report on Stablecoins and Unhosted Wallets, 3 March 2026. https://www.fatf-gafi.org/en/publications/Virtualassets/targeted-report-stablecoins-unhosted-wallets.html
[9] Chainalysis. 2026 Crypto Crime Report introduction, 8 January 2026. https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2026-crypto-crime-report-introduction/
[10] OECD. Bringing Tax Transparency to Crypto-Assets: An Update, 2024, p. 6. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2024/07/bringing-tax-transparency-to-crypto-assets-an-update_fa222834/b33c9aa1-en.pdf
